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Abstract
Grandparents are regular providers of free child care. Similar to other forms
of child care, availability of grandparent-provided child care affects fertility and la-
bor force participation of women positively. However, grandparent-provided child
care requires residing close to parents or in-laws which may imply costly spatial
restrictions. We find that mothers residing close to parents or in-laws have lower
wages and that the probability of having to commute increases if relatives pro-
vide child care. We build a model of residence choice, fertility, and female labor
force participation that can account for the observed relationships. We simulate
our model to analyze how women’s decisions would change if the availability of
grandparent-provided child care or family policies were altered. We find that if
child care subsidies were raised to the Swedish level, fertility and mothers’ labor
force participation would increase, while mobility would remain unchanged. The
absence of grandparents, on the other hand, would increase mobility, while it would
only have limited negative effects on aggregate fertility and labor force participation.
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1 Introduction
Grandparents are an important source of child care. According to data from the 2nd
wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), between 18%
(Denmark) and 49% (Italy) of grandparents take care of their grandchildren age six or
younger on a daily or weekly basis. More than 30% of grandparents in the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Switzerland provide weekly care, whereas in Italy, Greece, and Poland al-
most 30% look after their grandchildren each day (see Figure A-1 of the Appendix A).1
The availability of child care and especially cheap or even costless child care has impor-
tant effects on fertility and mothers’ labor force participation.2 For Italy, Del Boca [2002]
shows that both the availability of child care and the possibility of part time work in-
crease labor force participation and fertility. Blau and Robins [1989] establish a similar
pattern for the US. Within the context of already high female labor force participation
rates in Sweden, Mo¨rck et al [2009] is one of the few papers that focuses exclusively on
the positive effect of lower child care costs on fertility. In a literature summary, Del Boca
and Vuri [2007] point out that most studies find that high child care costs deter female
labor supply, while availability of child care is found to have positive effects on mothers’
labor force participation. These findings suggest that the main barrier that mothers face
at the time of working is to obtain affordable child care.3
Free grandparent-provided child care seems to be the perfect solution for working mothers.
However, in order to enjoy grandparent-provided child care on a regular basis, residence
choices of adult children and elderly parents have to coincide. Data from the 2nd wave of
SHARE show that the frequency of grandparent-provided child care is clearly related to
the geographical distance between parents and their adult children. Figure 1.1 displays the
frequency of grandparent-provided child care, together with the geographical distance be-
tween grandparents and their grandchildren (age six and younger) for Germany, Denmark,
Italy, and Spain. Across the four selected countries the frequency of care varies strongly,
but common to all countries those who provide care more frequently tend to live close by.4
1In the US, 22.7% of children under 5 are regularly cared for by their grandparents (Overturf John-
son [2005]).
2While female labor force participation has increased tremendously over the past decades, mothers
are still participating significantly less. Across OECD countries, the average difference in labor force
participation rates for women and mothers (of children age 3 or younger) is around 10 (20) percentage
points. Scandinavian countries are an exception where labor force participation rates of mothers are
equal to or even higher compared to those of women in general, OECD [2008].
3For instance, for a US family living below the poverty line, child care costs amount to 30% of income
(US Census Bureau [2011]).
4The same pattern can be observed across the rest of the countries included in SHARE; see Figures A-
3-A-2 of the Appendix A.
Figure 1.1: Frequency of care for and distance to grandchild, ≤ 6
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
Grandparent-provided child care – similar to other types of child care – may have posi-
tive effects on fertility and mothers’ labor force participation. However, – different from
other types of child care – it imposes spatial restrictions which may affect female labor
market outcomes negatively. Looking at German data we find that women residing close
to parents or in-laws have lower hourly and monthly wages. Furthermore we find that
mothers are more likely to incur in commutes if their children are regularly cared for by
relatives. Similar to other studies, we also find that women residing close to parents or
in-laws are more likely to have children, and that as mothers they are more likely to hold
a regular full or part time job. Given strong interdependencies of decisions regarding
residence, fertility, child care arrangements, and female labor force participation, our em-
pirical analysis faces problems of endogeneity and reversed causality. While our findings
can thus not be interpreted as causal, the observed relationships provide the motivation
for our theoretical model.
We build a model of residence choice, fertility decisions, and female labor force partici-
pation. In our model there are two regions. Both regions are characterized by the same
distribution of wage offers. Women who decide to work need to purchase child care. In
one of the two regions free grandparent-provided child care is available. A woman decides
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where to reside upon observing her potential wage-were she to work- and her spouse’s
income in each region. Both her wage and her spouse’s income are independent across
regions. So when deciding where to reside women might accept lower wages in turn for
free grandparent-provided child care. This mechanism generates the observed relationship
between lower wages and living close to parents or in-laws. Given that women are more
likely to have children and to work if child care is free, our model also replicates the posi-
tive relationships between fertility, labor force participation, and living close to parents or
in-laws. In our model, the simultaneous interaction of child care costs with two important
determinants of family migration decisions – husbands’ and wives’ wages – generates the
observed relationships.5 We then simulate the model to analyze how women’s decisions
would change if the availability of grandparent-provided child care or family policies were
altered. We find that if child care subsidies were raised to the Swedish level, fertility and
mothers’ labor force participation would increase, while mobility would remain unaltered.
The absence of grandparents, on the other hand, would increase mobility, while it would
only have limited negative effects on aggregate fertility and labor force participation.
To the best of our knowledge the current paper is the first one that explicitly incorporates
spatial restrictions imposed by grandparent-provided child care into a model of fertility
and labor force participation decisions. There is a strand of the literature analysing fertil-
ity and labor force participation in general equilibrium models as for instance Attanasio et
al [2010], Erosa et al [2010], Garc´ıa-Mora´n [2010], Greenwood et al [2000], or Guner and
Knowles [2009]. Closely related is Cardia and Ng [2003] who – different from the current
paper – explicitly incorporate grandparents’ decisions into a general equilibrium model
of grandparent-provided child care. The authors suggest that subsidizing grandparents’
time is the most effective child care policy in terms of output and capital accumulation.
However, they do not consider the spatial restrictions and potential costs in terms of labor
market outcomes implied by grandparent-provided child care. Also related to this paper
are the works by Bick [2010] and Mendez [2008]. Within a life cycle model, the former
analyzes data for Germany and concludes that informal child care (by relatives) plays an
important role given that mothers’ labor force participation exceeds child care enrollment
for children up to 2 years. However, different from the current paper the author does
not model relative-provided child care, nor the spatial restrictions that it imposes. The
paper by Mendez [2008] attempts to account for differences in geographical mobility and
female labor force participation across European countries. His model of residence choice,
fertility, and female labor force participation is similar to ours, but the author does not
provide any evidence for individual costs associated with living close to parents or in-laws.
5Mincer [1978] finds husbands’ wage offers to be determinant for family migration decisions, but to
a lesser extent if the wife is working and if her work is permanent and well paid. Hence, husbands’ and
wives’ wages jointly determine migration decisions.
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Thus, our paper is also - to the best of our knowledge - the first one to document possi-
ble costs related to the geographical proximity between parents and adult children. The
existing literature, on the contrary, has highlighted its positive aspects. Studying fertility
intentions rather than outcomes, Raymo et al [2010] find that Italian and Japanese women
living close to their parents have higher fertility intentions. Holdswoth and Dale [2009]
study labor force participation decisions of mothers in Spain and Britain. They estimate
that the probability of being in employment is 1.24 times higher for Spanish women whose
parents live in the same town. For the US, Compton and Pollak [2011] find that married
women with small children living close to mothers and mothers-in-law have a 10 percent-
age point higher probability to be in employment. The studies by Dimova and Wolff [2011]
and Zamarro [2011] use SHARE data and estimate simultaneous equation models of labor
supply and grandparent-provided child care. Zamarro [2011] only finds a positive effect
of grandparent-provided child care on mothers’ labor force participation for Greece and
the Netherlands. For ten European countries Dimova and Wolff [2011], who also include
financial transfers into their model, find a positive effect of grandparent-provided child
care on the extensive margin of female labor force participation but no effect along the
intensive margin. Arpino et al [2010] and Posadas and Vidal-Ferna´ndez [2012] for Italy
and the US respectively, find that grandparent-provided child care – instrumented by
grandparents being alive – increases in particular labor force participation of low edu-
cated mothers of young children.
Our paper is also related to a broader literature on intergenerational time transfers. Most
of this literature focuses on time transfers from children to elderly parents. One interesting
paper that also incorporates residence choices is Konrad et al [2002]. The authors develop
a game theoretical model of strategic choice of residence among siblings who try to avoid
having to take care of elderly parents. Looking at German data, they find support for
their model’s predictions of older siblings locating further away from their parents than
younger siblings. With a similar approach in mind, Stern [1995] estimates care choices of
elderly parents together with location decisions of children. His work is closely related to
the current paper as he also takes into account how the child’s location decision affects
his or her work decision. Alesina and Giuliano [2010] argue that the extent of intergen-
erational time transfers within the family – care of children or the elderly – is strongly
determined by the value of family ties in a society. The authors find that across coun-
tries a higher value of family ties is associated with lower geographical mobility, higher
fertility, but also with more traditional gender roles and thus lower female labor force
participation. In the current paper – on the contrary – we find that within a country
grandparent-provided child care is related to higher female labor force participation.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section presents our empir-
ical analysis, Section 3 presents the model, Section 4 describes our calibration strategy,
Section 5 presents the results of the model, and in Section 6 we discuss the model’s mech-
anisms in detail. In Section 7 we perform two counterfactual experiments and Section 8
concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Data
For our empirical analysis, we consider data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP), an annual household survey. The GSOEP provides extensive information on
individuals’ labor market participation, marital and family status, wages, education, etc.6
It also includes variables of particular interest for our analysis: child care provided by rel-
atives and geographical distance to parents. In four waves (1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006)
survey participants were asked to categorize their parents’ relative residence as in: i) the
same house, ii) the same neighborhood, iii) the same town, iv) another town but within
one hour by car, v) further away, or vi) in a foreign country. We construct a dummy
variable “parents or in-laws close” that takes on value one for individuals whose mother,
father, or in-law lives in the same neighborhood or town. For individuals who live in the
same house as their parents or in-laws we construct a different dummy variable “parents
or in-laws in same house.” This particular form of co-residence mostly arises because
young individuals still live at home or due to the need for intensive care of parents, and
in most cases it represents a temporary living arrangement. Only in two of the four waves
considered (2001 and 2006) did the survey also include questions about relative-provided
child care. We construct a dummy variable “child care by relatives” that takes on value
one for all mothers with children age six or younger if relatives regularly take care of this
child and a dummy variable “child care non-relatives” that takes on value one if the child
age six or younger attends a nursery or is being cared for by others than relatives. We
report these variables for two different age groups, for children up to the age of three
and those between the ages of three and six. In Germany, for children younger than three
very few spots in public or publicly subsidized nurseries are available, whereas for children
between the ages of 3 and 6, those spots are almost guaranteed.7
6For more details on the GSOEP, see SOEP [2005].
7In 2011 only 25.2% of children younger than three attended some form of private day care (85%) or
public or publicly subsidized nurseries (15%), compared to 93.4% of children between three and six (less
than 1% of them in private day care) (Statistische A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder [2011]). However,
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Given pronounced differences in mothers’ labor force participation rates between East
and West Germany, we introduce dummy variables to distinguish between individuals
living in East and West Germany.8 To account for possible cultural differences, we also
distinguish between individuals of German and other nationalities. We define three lev-
els of education following the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED
1997) designed by the UNESCO[1997]: (i) primary education (ISCED levels 0 and 1), (ii)
secondary education (ISCED levels 2, 3, and 4 ), (iii) tertiary education (ISCED levels
5 and 6).9 Town sizes are grouped into small communities (up to 20.000 inhabitants),
medium-sized communities (20.000-100.000 inhabitants), and large communities (more
than 100.000 inhabitants). We also construct dummy variables for each federal state.
Sample For our analysis we pool the data from the available four waves. We only
consider women age 25 to 50.10 We exclude those born outside of Germany, because for
these individuals both key variables of our analysis, (i) availability of child care by relatives
and (ii) residence relative to parents, might be determined by very different aspects. Our
sample consists of 10,732 women and 8,129 mothers.11
Descriptive Statistics Table A.1 of the Appendix A provides descriptive statistics for
our sample. Individuals are on average between 37 and 39 years old. Approximately 76%
of women between 25 and 50 have children and 10-13% are mothers of small children (age
0-2) and 14-19% have children age 3-6. Around 36% of women have a regular fulltime
most of these nurseries (for over 60% of children) provide only part-time arrangements, see European
Commission [2009]. Compulsory schooling for German children starts at age 6-7, reducing the need for
child care drastically. ’Regular child care by relatives’ includes child care by any relative but it is mostly
grandparents who provide child care. Similar spatial restrictions would apply for child care by other
relatives.
8Labor force participation rates of East German mothers of small children (0-3 years) have traditionally
been very high and even today they continue to be around 15 percentage points higher than rates for West
German mothers (Bundesministerium fu¨r Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend [2005].) In our sample,
labor force participation rates of mothers are 67% and 48% in East and West Germany respectively.
9For our regression analysis we only differentiate between individuals with and without tertiary edu-
cation.
10We exclude individuals living in East Germany from the 1991 wave, because for this wave information
for most labor market variables (participation, wages) are missing for East Germans.
11We also exclude individuals who report to have worked regular full-or part time jobs but who also
report to have worked fewer than twenty hours a month as well as those who report to work regular
full-or part time jobs but do not report their wage income or firm tenure or report zero or negative values
for any of the two variables.
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job and 24% hold a regular part time job. Mothers are more prone to hold part time jobs
(29%) compared to fulltime jobs (25%).12 Around 42-44% of women and mothers live in
the same neighborhood or town as their parents or in-laws and 43-44% live at least one
hour away. Approximately 13-14% of individuals live in the same house or household with
parents or in-laws. Only 14% of mothers of children younger than age three, but 84% of
mothers of children between the ages of three and six use nursery care, sitters or other
types of paid child care. Around one third has their children cared for by relatives on a
regular basis.13 Hourly wages of women and mothers are around 12AC.14 Around 50% of
individuals commute to their place of work.
Proximity to Grandparents and Relative-Provided Child Care Child care by
relatives is not only likely to influence mothers’ labor force participation decision, but at
the same time its use might be determined by mothers’ decision to work. This reversed
causality introduces a potential bias into a direct measure of grandparent-provided child
care. Using geographical proximity to grandparents as an indirect measure of grandparent-
provided child care solves this problem. However, as residence choices might not be in-
dependent of mothers’ labor force participation decisions, a caveat remains. Descriptives
statistics show that geographical proximity to grandparents and child care provided by
relatives are very much related (see Table A.2 of the Appendix A). The clear relationship
displayed in Figure 1.1 regarding child care by relatives and proximity to grandparents
hence also holds for our data set. We thus feel confident to use geographical proximity
as an indirect measure of grandparent-provided child care. Furthermore, geographical
proximity reflects more than just currently provided child care by grandparents. It might
also reflect child care provided by “potential” grandparents if living close to parents or
in-laws affects fertility decisions. Thus, geographical proximity proves particularly useful
to test effects on fertility. In addition, geographical proximity might also reflect “child
care provided in the past” if individuals continue to live close to parents or in-laws after
children have grown beyond the child care age. In this case the indirect measure can also
12These figures correspond to 1991-2006 and are thus lower compared to more recent data. While in
1996, 75.7% of women and 58.5% of mothers age 25 to 54 participated in the German labor market, by
2004 these rates had increased to 77.0% and 63.1% respectively. This increase was almost exclusively
due to an increase in labor force participation rates of mothers in West Germany from 54.4% in 1996 to
61.6% in 2004 (Bundesministerium fu¨r Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend [2005]). Regarding labor
force participation of mothers with children under 6, those increased from 51.4% in 1991 (OECD [2001])
to 66.3% by 2009 (OECD [2008]).
13Those two options are not exclusive. For children ages (0-2) and (3-6), 36% and 35% of mothers
who use private care also have relatives looking after their children on a regular basis, and 15% and 86%
respectively of those who use relative-provided care also use private care for their children.
14When pooling the sample we only adjust wages for the change from Deutschmark to Euro. We do
not adjust for wage growth, given stagnant real hourly net wages in Germany between 2001 and 2006
(see Figure 1 in DIW [2009]).
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be used to test long-lasting effects of on wages.
However, geographical proximity is only a necessary condition for grandparent-provided
child care. Other aspects such as employment status, age, or health status of grandparents
may determine if grandparents actually provide care for their grandchildren. Mothers of
around 20% of women in our sample also participated in the GSOEP during the four waves
considered. The number of observations for these mother-daughter pairs is extremely lim-
ited and thus not suited for regression analysis. However, considering descriptive statistics
we observe that grandmothers who live close to their daughters who in turn report to use
relative-provided child care are younger, and they are also less likely to work (see Ta-
ble A.3 of the Appendix A). Surprisingly, these grandmothers also report worse health
conditions. This might be explained by the fact that grandmothers’ status of health does
not only determine if they provide child care, but caring for grandchildren may have a
negative effect on grandmothers’ health.15
2.2 Benefits of Grandparent-Provided Child Care
In line with findings in the literature discussed before, we find geographical proximity
to (“potential”) grandparents to affect fertility and labor force participation of mothers
positively. Women living in the same neighborhood or town as their parents or in-laws
have a 4 percentage points higher probability to have children (see Table A.4 of the Ap-
pendix A). We find this positive effect to be particularly strong for women with university
education.16 Regarding participation, we find that mothers residing close to their parents
or in-laws have a 3 percentage points higher probability to hold a regular part-or fulltime
job (see Table A.6 of the Appendix A).17 This last number is close to the 4 percentage
15According to Hughes et al [2011], a “ growing literature suggests that for many people, the net health
effects of grandchild care are negative”(p.111).
16See Table A.5 of the Appendix A for the regressions with interaction terms. Estimation results are
consistent to the inclusion of a polynomial for age instead of age group dummies as well as to including
years of education instead of educational categories. Given that marital status and spouse’s income might
be correlated with living close to parents or in-laws we also check consistency of results, excluding both
variables.
17For our estimations regarding labor force participation we only consider a woman in the labor force
if she works a regular part-or fulltime job. All estimation results are consistent to the inclusion of a
polynomial for age instead of age group dummies as well as to including years of education instead of
educational categories. Results are robust to the exclusion of the variables marital status and spouse’s
income. Including interaction terms of living close to parents or in-laws and educational attainment
seems to indicate that the positive effect of living close to parents or in-laws on mothers’ labor force
participation is driven by individuals with tertiary education. However, coefficients are only (negatively)
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points lower bound of estimates for the US in Compton and Pollak [2011]. The latter
argue that geographical proximity is a good instrument for child care arrangements be-
cause its positive effect on labor force participation does not extend to groups for which
grandparent-provided child care is not a determinant for labor supply. Similarly, in our
data the effect does not extend neither to men nor to single childless women (see Table A.7
of the Appendix A).
2.3 Costs of Grandparent-Provided Child Care
Lower wages Controlling for selection effects, we find that mothers living close to their
parents or in-laws earn lower hourly wages.18 The first column of Table 2.1 displays the
coefficients for the Heckman selection model for log hourly wages for mothers in Germany
age 25 to 50. Living close to parents or in-laws or in the same house increases the prob-
ability of holding a regular part-or fulltime job, but it reduces hourly wages by almost
5%.19 Other control variables show the expected signs. Wages are higher for those living
in larger communities, they increase with firm tenure, and tertiary education. On the
other hand, having more children, living in small communities, not being German, and
living in East Germany are all aspects that affect hourly wages negatively.20 We also
check if our results are driven by low-educated individuals. Running the regression sepa-
rately for individuals with and those without tertiary education shows that this is not the
case. On the contrary, the penalty in hourly wages for staying close to parents or in-laws
turns out to be higher – more than 6% – for the group of highly educated individuals (see
Tables A.11 and A.12 of the Appendix A).
The two exclusion restrictions that we use are: (i) having a child younger than age three
and (ii) spouse’s income. Both variables affect mothers’ labor force participation (see
Table A.6 of the Appendix A). However, none is directly related to mothers’ hourly wage
rates. Given that we only consider mothers, differences in a child’s age are mostly ex-
significant for individuals with primary or secondary education.
18For this analysis, we only consider wage incomes of dependent workers of regular full-or part time
jobs.
19Using log monthly wages, controlled for by hours worked, leads to slightly more negative coefficients
for living close (see Table A.8 of the Appendix A), as does not controlling for selection effects (see
Table A.9 of the Appendix A for an OLS regression of log hourly wages).
20Estimation results are consistent to the inclusion of a polynomial for age instead of age group dummies
as well as to including years of education instead of educational categories. We also check the robustness
of our results to the exclusion of the variables marital status and spouse’s income (see Table A.10 of the
Appendix A).
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Table 2.1: Proximity to grandparents and hourly wages
Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for mothers’ log hourly wages
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Married, living together -0.009 (0.016) -0.324*** (0.044)
Number of children -0.037*** (0.010) -0.286*** (0.017)
Other than German nationality -0.134* (0.077) -0.312** (0.140)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.293*** (0.015) 0.441*** (0.036)
Parents or in-laws close -0.049*** (0.014) 0.073** (0.033)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.050** (0.020) 0.056 (0.048)
Small community -0.040** (0.017) -0.006 (0.039)
Large community 0.046** (0.019) 0.045 (0.044)
in East Germany -0.069 (0.044) 0.294** (0.119)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.015*** (0.005)
Children 0-2 -1.114*** (0.056)
Tenure in firm 0.016*** (0.001)
Constant 1.905*** (0.046) 0.188** (0.087)
Observations 8,129 8,129
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 91,96, 01,06; Mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried mothers of age 25-29 of children age 3 or older
living in West Germany, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town in North
Rhine-Westphalia, far from parents or in-laws. All regressions include year dummies, age group dummies and state dummies.
plained for by the mother’s own age and her years of education. We control for both
variables in the wage estimation. The second exclusion restriction might be invalid if as-
sortative matching leads to similar incomes of wife and spouse. As long as these similarities
are mostly explained for by a common level of education or the size of the community they
live in – both variables that we include as controls – the use of this exclusion restriction
is justified.
More Commuting Costs of spatial restrictions may also arise from commutes. Rupert
et al [2009], looking at French data find that mothers with small children, who have a
lower bargaining power as workers incur in longer commutes. We find that for working
mothers of children of age six or younger the probability of having to commute is almost 9
percentage points higher if their children are regularly cared for by relatives. Table 2.2 dis-
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plays marginal effects from the probit estimation for the probability of having to commute
for mothers in Germany age 25 to 50.21
Table 2.2: Grandparent-provided child care and commutes
Marginal effects from Probit estimation for mothers
Married, living together 0.005 (0.055)
Number of children 0.053 (0.033)
Other than German nationality -0.278** (0.127)
Children 0-2 -0.026 (0.063)
Log (Spouse’s income)† -0.003 (0.011)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.127** (0.051)
Tenure in firm 0.004 (0.004)
Children cared for by relatives 0.087* (0.048)
Children in non-relative care -0.010 (0.072)
Small community 0.262*** (0.056)
Large community -0.213*** (0.065)
in East Germany -0.227* (0.136)
Observations 537
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel, 01,06; mothers 25-50 of children
<= 6 years with regular full or part time job. Reference Group: unmarried mothers of
age 25-29 in 2001 with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in a medium-sized West
German town in North Rhine-Westphalia, whose children are not in nursery, nor cared
for by relatives. All regressions include dummies for age groups, states, and years.
Having children in a nursery or with a sitter, on the other hand, does not affect the
likelihood of being a commuter. Other control variables show the expected sign. The
probability of having to commute is lower for those of other nationalities and for indi-
viduals living in large communities in East Germany. It is higher for mothers in small
communities.22
21We only consider waves 2001 and 2006 that include a question on commutes.
22Again results are consistent to the way the variables age and education are included. Having a child in
a nursery may be correlated with child care by relatives. Hence, we also check the robustness of our results
to the exclusion of this variable (see Table A.13 of the Appendix A). When running separate regressions
for individuals with and without tertiary education, coefficients loose significance. However, coefficients
for relative-provided child care for both groups of individuals with and without tertiary education are
similar (see Table A.14 of the Appendix A).
11
Given strong interdependencies of decisions regarding residence, fertility, child care ar-
rangements, and female labor force participation, our empirical analysis faces problems
of endogeneity and reversed causality. By using geographical proximity between adult
children and their parents as an indirect measure of grandparent-provided child care, we
addressed the interdependency of child care arrangements and female labor force partici-
pation. However, certain caveats remain because we cannot dismiss a reversed causality
between geographical proximity and labor market outcomes or fertility. Nevertheless,
from the observed relationships between labor force participation, fertility, commuting,
and wages with grandparent-provided child care a set of interesting questions arise: How
valuable is grandparent-provided child care in terms of fertility and employment? How
do family policies compare to grandparent-provided child care with respect to effects on
aggregate employment, mobility, and fertility? In order to answer these questions and
to better disentangle women’s decision, we build a model economy that incorporates the
spatial restrictions imposed by grandparent-provided child care.
3 The Model
In our model economy there are two regions where individuals can reside, ’Home’ denoted
by ’H’ and ’Far’, denoted by ’F’. The only ex-ante difference between the two regions is
that grandparent-provided child care is only available in ’H’. The economy is populated
by a continuum of married women of mass one.23 Women in our economy live for two
periods, each of three years. Essentially we want to capture mothers’ decisions during the
time when child care is most important, i.e. during early childhood.
At the beginning of the first period, women receive two ’life-course offers’, one associated
with living in ’H’ and the other associated with living in ’F’. Each offer consists of: i)
a realization of her labor productivity x and ii) an exogenous source of income, z repre-
senting a spouse’s income, where x ∈ x1, x2, ..., xN and z ∈ z1, z2, ..., zN , with N denoting
the number of different labor productivities and spouses’ incomes in the economy. Offers
are independent of the region and independent of each other. Upon observing these two
23In our GSOEP sample only 2.4% of single women (heads of household, not living with another adult)
are mothers, while 86% of married women who live together with their spouses are mothers. Hence, we
only model married women’s decisions. Even though marriage and residence decisions might be related,
in order to keep the analysis tractable we abstain from modeling a marriage market and we simply assign
an exogenous income to each woman to represent her husband’s income.
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offers, women have to decide where to reside. We assume that residence choices are only
taken once during a woman’s life time and cannot be reconsidered. Let D denote the
residence choice that takes on value 1 if a woman decides to reside in ’F.’ If she decides
to reside in ’H’, D is equal to 0. Women also have to decide whether to have children and
how much to work. In the first period, women decide whether or not to have children,
k = 1 or k = 0. Children remain with their mother during the two periods. Each period
a woman is endowed with one unit of productive time and she has to decide how much to
work.
Working mothers need child care. The price of child care per unit of time, pi(D) depends
on the woman’s residence choice and on the age of her child, with i ∈ 1, 2. Mothers
with small children – from age 0 to 3 – who have no access to free child care pay p1(1).
Mothers with older children – ages 3 to 6 – pay p2(1). Living in ’H’ potentially provides
access to free child care by grandparents, pi(0) = 0. However, with a certain probability
grandparents fall sick, are not alive, still work, or are otherwise unable to take care of
their grandchildren. In the first period, only a share p(g) of women who live in ’H’ obtain
free child care. The remaining (1 − p(g)) have to purchase child care at price p1(1). In
the second period, only a share p(g) of those who had access to free child care continue
to do so. The remaining (1− p(g)p(g)) face child care costs equal to p2(1). Women might
receive a subsidy for child care ω from the government. In this case they pay (1−ω)pi(1)
for each unit of time their children spend in child care.24 Women might also receive family
benefits T conditional on having children.
Women with children (k = 1) care about the quality of their children, e and about
consumption, c. Hence, they enjoy the following utility
U(c, e, k) =
c1−σ
1− σ +
(
σee− σk) k,
where σk are fixed costs per child. Childless women (k = 0) only care about consumption.
The quality of children, e is a function of the time a mother spends with her children, tm
and the time her children spend in child care tc,
e = φmtm + φctc.
Time spent in child care is assumed to be equal to the time the mother is at work. A
mother spends her remaining time taking care of her children,
tc + tm = 1.
24We assume that this subsidy is only paid to women who purchase child care at price pi(1), i.e. to
those living in ’F’ and those living in ’H’ who have no access to free grandparent-provided child care.
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How a mother divides her time between working and taking care of her children crucially
depends on how decisive her time is for her children’s quality. This is captured by the two
weights, φm for time spent with the mother and φc for time spent in child care or with
grandparents. We assume time in child care and time spent with grandparents to be of
equal importance for children’s quality.25
3.1 Value functions
We solve our model backwards by first presenting the value functions for women in the
second period.
Value functions in the second period For childless women with labor productivity
x and spouse’s income z, the value of residing in ’H’ is
H2(x, z) =
c1−σ
1− σ ,
subject to the budget constraint
c = (1− τ)(x+ z),
where τ denotes an income tax rate. Childless women only care about consumption, they
work all their disposable time, l = 1 and they consume all disposable income. The value
of residing in ’F’ for a childless woman of type x and spouse’s income z is equal to the
value for living in ’H’, F 2(x, z) = H2(x, z).
When deciding how much to work, mothers, on the other hand take into account that
their children’s quality depends on how much time they spend taking care of them. Thus
25Formal child care and grandparent-provided child might be very different. For the first nine months,
Hansen and Hawkes [2009] find that formal child care is associated with higher school readiness scores,
while grandparent-provided child care is associated with a higher vocabulary test score; both measured
at the age of three. Hence, it is not clear whether one of them is of higher quality than the other. Bernal
and Keane [2011] find that informal child care has negative effects on children’s test scores while center-
based care does not. However, the authors study single mothers only. This clearly introduces a bias
towards more disadvantaged backgrounds of mothers and as well as towards informal care providers. In
another study, Bernal [2008] finds that non-maternal child care is detrimental for children’s scores. Hence
if grandparent-provided child care is similar to the type of care a mother provides, then grandparents
might be the second best option. Moreover, children in informal care might receive more individual
attention, see Clarke-Stewart et al. [1994] and grandparents tend to guarantee a stable provider-child
relationship, something found to be determinant for the quality of child care (see Walker [1991]).
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the value function for a mother living in ’H’ who has access to free child care during the
second period is given by
H2(x, z, k) = max
l
(
c1−σ
1− σ + (σ
ee− σk)k
)
,
subject to the budget constraint
c = (1− τ)(xl + z) + T,
and given the children’s quality production function
e = φmtm + φctc.
Women only decide to have children during the first period. At the beginning of the
second period all children are three years old. Mothers who work and who have no
access to free child care –those living in ’F’ and those living in ’H’ but without access to
grandparent-provided child care– will have to purchase child care at price p2(1) per unit
of time worked. The value function for a mother without access to free child care in the
second period is given by
F 2(x, z, k) = max
l
(
c1−σ
1− σ + (σ
ee− σk)k
)
,
subject to the budget constraint
c = (1− τ)(xl + z) + T − (1− ω)p2(1)l,
and given the children’s quality production function
e = φmtm + φctc.
Value functions in the first period A woman who resides in ’H’ has to decide whether
to have children and how much to work. Only a share of working women p(g) has access
to free child care provided by grandparents. If a woman has access to free child care, her
value function is given by
H1(x, z) = max
l,k
(
c1−σ
1− σ + (σ
ee− σk)k + β(p(g)H2(x, z, k) + (1− p(g))F 2(x, z, k)
)
,
subject to the budget constraint
c = (1− τ)(xl + z) + T,
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and given the children’s quality production function
e = φmtm + φctc.
Given that residence choices are only made at the beginning of the first period, the con-
tinuation value for a woman living in ’H’ is equal to the discounted value of living in
’H’ in the second period. In the second period, with probability p(g), she continues to
have access to grandparent-provided child care. On the other hand, a share (1− p(g)) of
mothers who live in ’H’ and who work, have to pay for child care. Their problem is the
same as that of working mothers living in ’F’.
If a woman resides in ’F’, she has to decide whether to have children and how much to
work, taking into account that if she has children and works, she has to purchase child
care at price p1(1). Child care services might be subsidized at a rate ω. The value function
in the first period for a woman living in ’F’ or living in ’H’ but without access to free
child care is given by
F 1(x, z) = max
l,k
(
c1−σ
1− σ + (σ
ee− σk)k + βF 2(x, z, k))
subject to the budget constraint
c = (1− τ)(xl + z) + T − (1− ω)p1(1)l
and given the children’s quality production function
e = φmtm + φctc.
Residence Decisions When deciding where to reside, women do not know for sure if
they will have access to grandparent-provided child care in ’H’. They thus consider the
expected value of living in ’H’ which is given by
EH1∗ = p(g)H1∗(x, z) + (1− p(g))F 1∗(x, z)),
where F 1∗(x, z) and H1∗(x, z) denote the value functions evaluated at the optimal deci-
sions of labor supply and number of children. Women decide where to reside by comparing
the expected value of living in ’H’ to the value of living in ’F’. They will decide to live
in ’F’ if the expected value of living in ’H’ is strictly higher than the value of living in ’F’.26
26Individuals who are indifferent are distributed equally across the two regions.
16
If child care were free in both regions there would only be two reasons why women would
decide to reside in ’F’: (i) a higher labor productivity and/or (ii) a higher spouse’s income.
However, once child care is costly women’s residence choices depend on the life-course
offers for each of the two regions, the price of child care in ’F’ and the availability of free
child care in ’H’. A woman who receives the same life-course offer in both regions– the
same productivity x and the same spouse’s income z – will always decide to live in ’H’
because this is where she may obtain free child care. However, life-course offers can differ.
Assume that a woman receives an offer (x, z)H associated with living in ’H’ and an offer
(x, z)F associated with living in ’F’. Her offer could include a higher labor productivity
in ’F’, (xF > xH) , a lower labor productivity in ’F’ , (xF < xH) or labor productivities
could be the same, (xF = xH). Moreover, spouses’ incomes might also be different. In
this case, residence choices become non-trivial. A higher offer might not be enough to
compensate for the cost of child care and a woman might decide to reside in ’H’ even
if the life-course offer in ’F’ is higher. In the following subsection we analyze the closed
form solution for labor supply in our model and we discuss how changes in the price of
child care and life-course offers affect women’s labor supply decision.
3.2 Labor Supply
For our relatively simple model of grandparent-provided child care and women’s labor
market outcomes, we are able to obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal labor
supply. Childless women work all their disposable time, l∗ = 1. For mothers on the other
hand, the optimal labor supply is given by
l∗ =
(
1
σe(φm − φc)
) 1
σ
(x(1− τ)− (1− ω)pi(1)) 1−σσ − (1− τ)z + T
(1− τ)x− (1− ω)pi(1) ,
subject to
0 ≤ l∗ ≤ 1, for i = 1, 2.
Mothers’ optimal labor supply depends crucially on how important time spent with their
mother is for children’s quality, compared to the time spent in child care or with grand-
parents. We assume that time with mothers is at least as important as time in child care
(φm ≥ φc). Mothers’ labor supply also depends on the relationship between mothers’ la-
bor productivity and the cost of child care, as well as on the relative value of the spouse’s
income compared to mothers’ labor productivity. Women whose marginal benefit from
working – their labor productivity x – is lower than the marginal cost of working – the
cost of child care, pi(1) for i ∈ 1, 2 – will decide to stay home. On the other hand, if the
mothers’ time for children’s quality were of equal importance as time spent in child care,
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φm = φc, women whose labor productivity is high enough would work all their disposable
time
l∗ =
{
0 for (1− τ)x < (1− ω)pi(1) and φm ≥ φc
1 for (1− τ)x > (1− ω)pi(1) and φm = φc.
In case φm > φc, women whose labor productivity suffices to pay for child care will work,
0 ≤ l∗ ≤ 1 . Even though, a mother’s time has a higher weight for children’s quality,
working increases disposable income and consequently consumption. The effect of other
parameters on the optimal labor supply is as expected. A higher weight of consumption
for utility (σ), increases labor supply. An increase in the importance of time spent in
child care for children’s quality and an increase in labor productivity have similar effects.
On the other hand, an increase in the weight of a mother’s time for children’s quality
reduces labor supply. Similarly an increase in the cost of child care and an increase in
the spouse’s income decrease labor supply. In particular mothers supply no labor if their
spouse’s income is large enough,
l∗ = { 0 if z > 1
1−τ [
(
x(1−τ)−(1−ω)pj(1)
σe(φm−φc)
)1/σ
− T ].
4 Calibration Strategy
In order to be able to quantify the importance of grandparent-provided child care and the
effect of family policies for women’s decisions on residence, labor supply, and fertility, we
calibrate our model. Some parameters of the model are fixed based on available evidence.
The remaining parameters are calibrated to match the model to several labor market
statistics and fertility data from Germany. Most statistics used for calibration come from
pooled waves 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006 of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
We consider weighted statistics for married women in West Germany ages 20 to 48 for
whom information on parents’ residence is available.27 Finally, we set policy parameters
to represent German family policies.
In our model economy, individuals are distributed over different life-course offers. This
distribution is denoted by Π(xh, zh, xf , zf ), chosen such as to be consistent with the ex-
istence of an initial distribution of women over labor productivities, Ω(x) and an initial
distribution of men over labor productivities, Θ(z). Hence Ω(xi) denotes the mass of
women who are of productivity type xi, for i = 1...N . Labor productivities x and z fol-
low a log normal distribution. We discretize the distribution of men’s observed wages to
27We chose ages 20 to 48 because this is the age range of women with children 0-6. We only consider
individuals who report if they have children, and if and how they participate in the labor market. For
men, we use wage data for married working individuals older than 20.
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obtain twenty different types of spouses’ incomes. Mean and standard deviation of men’s
productivity distribution are denoted by µz and σz. The distribution of women’s observed
wages, on the other hand, is much more likely to be effected by selection into employment.
We assume the standard deviation of men and women’s wages to be the same and we cal-
ibrate the mean of women’s underlying productivity distribution to match the observed
mean wage for women. Estimates for these parameters (µz, σz, σx) and calibration targets
(µx) are taken from the distribution of hourly wage rates observed in our GSOEP sample.
They are µz = 2.74 and σz = 0.41 for men and µx = 2.46 and σx = σz = 0.41 for women.
A life-course offer is a labor productivity and a spouse’s income. It can be interpreted
as a couple formed by a woman of productivity, x and a man of income z. Thus, the
probability of an offer is equivalent to a matching probability between a woman and a
man. The probability that an offer (xi, zj)
d for d = H,F is realized, or that a woman
of type xi matches with a man of type zj is denoted by Φ(x, z). If a man and a woman
are of the same type, i = j, this probability is equal to ψ. Otherwise the probability is
given by 1−ψ
N−1 for i ∈ 1, ..., N and j ∈ 1, ..., N . To assign a value to ψ, we use the degree
of assortative matching indicating how likely it is to meet your own productivity type.
Ferna´ndez et al. [2005] estimate this value to be 0.7 for Germany, i.e. 70% of women in
Germany match with men of the same type. The remaining 30% are equally likely to
match with men of types different from their own.
In order to determine the distribution of life-course offers, Π[(x, z)H , (x, z)F ], we need to
know how many individuals receive an offer (xi, zj)
H in ’H’ and an offer (xr, zp)
F in ’F’,
for i, j, r, p ∈ 1, ..., N . For instance, how many women receive a particular offer (x1, z3)H
in ’H’ and an offer (x3, z5)
F in ’F’? The number of individuals receiving the offer (x1, z3)
H
depends on the number of individuals of type x1 – given by Ω(x1) – and on the number of
individuals of type z3, – given by Θ(z3) – and on the probability of this match happening,
Φ(x1, z3). Thus the number of women receiving an offer (x1, z3)
H is equal to the product
of the three elements, Ω(x1)Θ(z3)Φ(x1, z3). It is thus equal to the probability of a woman
being of type x1 and the probability of a man having income z3 and the probability for
this match to happen. Likewise, the number of individuals receiving an offer (x3, z5)
F is
given by Ω(x3)Θ(z5)Φ(x3, z5). Hence the number of individuals receiving the two offers
detailed above is equal to the probability of individuals receiving an offer (x1, z3)
H times
the probability of individuals receiving an offer (x3, z5)
F , normalized by the probability
of receiving any offer. Given that there is a mass one of individuals, the number of indi-
viduals of a certain type is given by the probability of being an individual of that type.
Each element of Π[(x, z)h, (x, z)f ] is calculated in the same fashion. The distribution of
life-course offers is key to our analysis, as it determines how individuals are distributed
across different offers, which will have implications for the model’s aggregate statistics.
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According to SHARE around 16.8% of German grandparents who live close to their small
grandchildren [0-3), take care of them on a daily basis. Mothers of around 89% of women
in our GSOEP sample are still alive. Hence we assign value 0.14 to the parameter p(g)
that denotes the share of women who live in ’H’ and who have access to grandparent-
provided child care. Given that one model period is equivalent to 3 years, the discount
factor, β is set to a value of 0.889 in order to match a yearly interest rate of 4%. Table 4.3
displays all parameters set a priori.
Table 4.3: Parameters based on a priori information
Parameter Explanation Value
σx standard deviation of women’s log productivity 0.41
µz mean log productivity of spouses 2.74
σz standard deviation of spouses’ log productivity 0.41
p(g) % of women with access to free care in ’H’ 0.14
ψ assortative matching parameter 0.7
β discount factor 0.889
We calibrate the parameters of the utility function, (σ, σe, σk), the cost of child care in
both periods, p1(1) and p2(1), women’s mean log hourly wage rate µx, as well as the
parameters of the children’s quality function, (φm, φc). Note that we impose φm +φc = 1,
and hence we only need to calibrate one of the two parameters. We now relate the cali-
brated parameters to the data moments that they are most likely to affect.
We set the mean of the distribution of women’s underlying productivities x¯ to 2.31 in
order to match working women’s observed mean log hourly wage rate, µx of 2.46. The
weight of consumption in the utility function, σ is set to 0.976, to match the percentage of
working women in ’H’.28 Given that on average these women face lower child care costs,
their participation decision is very much determined by the value of consumption. We
use two moments related to fertility and participation to match the fixed utility cost of
children, σk and the weight of children’s quality, σe in the utility function. The weight
of children’s quality affects the decision of whether to participate in the labor market or
not. Thus, to match this parameters we use the participation rate of mothers with older
28We join variables “parents or in-laws in same house” and “parents or in-laws close.” Hence those in
’H’ are individuals who live in the same house, neighborhood, or town as their parents or in-laws.
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children [3-6) in ’H’ who face lower child care costs. Whether a woman wants to become
a mother or not is related to the fixed cost of children. Hence we use the percentage of
women who are mothers in ’H’ to match the fixed cost σk. We set σk and σe to 0.35 and
1.2 respectively.
The weight of mothers’ time for children’s quality, φm determines how much a mother
works depending on her child’s age. We calibrate this parameter to match the percentage
of working mothers with small children [0-3) in ’H’. This parameter takes on value 0.672.
The OECD [2008] estimates that child care costs for a two-year-old in Germany amount
to 9.1% of average income. We set the first period child care cost for small children [0,3)
p1(1) to 1 to match this number.29 The price of child care in the second period is cali-
brated to match the participation rate of mothers with older children [3-6) in ’F’. This
parameter takes on value 0.75. Table 4.4 displays the calibrated parameters of the model.
Table 4.4: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
x¯ mean underlying productivity of women 2.31
σ weight of consumption 0.976
σe weight of children quality 1.2
σk fixed cost of children 0.35
φm weight of mother’s time 0.672
p1(1) cost of child care, period 1 1
p2(1) cost of child care, period 2 0.75
Finally, the model’s policy parameters are the income tax rate, τ , child care subsidies, ω
and family benefits, T . We set τ to 37% which is equivalent to the income tax revenue
collected by the German government as a fraction of GDP (OECD [2010]). According
to the OECD [2009], all German families receive some family benefits for each child up
to the age of eighteen (Kindergeld). In particular, they receive 184 Euros per month for
the first child, 190 for the second and 205 for the third, fourth, fifth child etc. We set
the amount of family benefits in our economy, T such as to match that for the average
German family (in terms of income and number of children), Kindergeld is equivalent to
29Note that in our model men and women who are not taking care of their children work all their
disposable time. Given that we targeted hourly wage rates, the resulting average income in the model
is too high compared to the data. In order to calculate child care costs as a fraction of average income
we impose a maximum work day equal to 40% of disposable time, i.e. 40 hours per week of 98 hours
disposable time after subtracting 10 hours per day for sleeping, eating, personal care.
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around 5% of family income. Hence, T is set to 0.522. According to the same source,
child care subsidies for small children [0-3) are negligible in Germany. Therefore, we set
child care subsidies (ω) to zero. All policy parameters are displayed in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Policy parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
τ income tax 0.37
T Family Benefits 0.522
ω child care subsidy 0
5 Results-Benchmark Economy
Table 5.6 presents model moments from our benchmark economy together with the cor-
responding data moments from our GSOEP sample.
Table 5.6: Data and model moments
Data Model
LFP of mothers, children [0-3) in ’H’ 26.75 28.68
LFP of mothers, children [3-6) in ’H’ 46.22 51.09
LFP of mothers, children [3-6) in ’F’ 44.10 49.17
LFP of women in ’H’ 50.36 57.86
Mean log hourly wage rate of working women 2.46 2.46
% of women being mothers in ’H’ 72.34 70.09
Child care costs as % of average income 9.10 9.88
Our model matches labor force participation of mothers with small children [0-3) who
live close to parents or in-laws, particularly well. This rate is equal to 26.75% in the
data while the model estimates it to be 28.68%. On the other hand, the model slightly
overestimates labor force participation of mothers with children between the ages of 3
and 6. While in the data this rate is 46.22% in ’H’, the model estimates a rate of 51.09%.
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In ’F’, this rate is 44.10% in the data while the model predicts that 49.17% of mothers
with children between 3 and 6 who live far from parents or in-laws work. We slightly
overestimate the labor force participation of all women who live close to parents or in-
laws. This rate is 50.36 in the data, while the model estimates a rate of 57.74. This is
partly due to overestimating labor force participation of mothers with older children in
’H’. In addition, all childless women work all their disposable time because leisure has
no value for utility in our model set-up. The model predicts an average log hourly wage
rate for working women of 2.46, matching perfectly the wage rate observed in the data.
The model also performs fairly well in terms of matching data on fertility. In our model,
women can only decide whether to become mothers or not. Thus we cannot say anything
about the average number of children per woman. However, the model matches closely
the percentage of married women who are mothers, 70.09% in the model compared to
72.34% in the data. In Germany, the cost of child care for small children [0-3), is equal to
9.10% of average income while the model predicts this cost to be 9.88%. Thus the model
also matches child care costs well.
Model moments in Table 5.6 were targeted explicitly to calibrate certain parameters. In
order to assess the model’s validity for carrying out policy analysis, we need to consider
the model’s performance in matching moments that have not been used for calibration.
Table 5.7 shows these un-targeted moments of the model and the corresponding data
moments.
Table 5.7: Data and model moments: not used for calibration
Data Model
% of women being mothers, ’F’ 66.75 64.28
Aggregate LFP rate of women 48.90 57.74
LFP rate of women, ’F’ 47.62 57.61
LFP rate of mothers children [0-3), ’F’ 20.55 19.00
Share of female married population living in ’H’ 43.43 52.62
Average time spent with child, all mothers, as % of total time 64.37 57.14
Average time spent with child, working mothers, as % of total time (35.33-57.24) 37.64
The model produces particularly good estimates of the percentage of women who are
mothers in ’F’ as well as of the labor force participation of mothers with small children
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in ’F’. These statistics are key to our analysis of the relationship between mothers’ labor
force participation and the availability of child care. On the other hand, as expected our
model without leisure in the utility function overestimates aggregate female labor force
participation. Moreover, the model predicts that 52.62 per cent of women live in ’H’,
while in the data, 43 per cent of women live close to parents or in-laws. The model some-
what overestimates this statistic. However, taking into account that we did not target
this number in the calibration the model does fairly well.
We also report the percentage of time mothers devote to taking care of their children.
In our model, individuals do not value leisure and hence when a mother is not working,
she is taking care of her children. Hence, time spent taking care of children is a residual.
However, in the data we observe women spending their non work-related time on other
activities besides child care. Hence, we cannot reproduce actual time spent on child care,
but we want to show how our model performs in terms of mother’s time spent on child
care relative to work-related activities. In order to do so, we make the data comparable
to our model by assuming that the sum of time women spend on child care and time for
work-related activities is equal to their total disposable time. Our data comes from an
OECD report on time use, OECD [2011]. It contains the time women in a couple with at
least one child of preschool age devote to various activities. We are interested in how much
time women spend on child care–both as primary or secondary activity- as a percentage
of total time– child care plus work-related time. For Germany, all mothers spend 63.37
per cent of their time on child care, while our model predicts that all mothers spend 57.17
per cent of their time on child care. For working women, the data differentiates between
those working part time and those who work full time. We report both values and we
take them to be lower and upper bounds for time spent taking care of children by working
mothers in our model. In the data, mothers who work full time spend 35.33 per cent of
their time caring for their children. Meanwhile those who work part time spend a larger
share of their time taking care of their children, 57.24%. In our model, working mothers
spend 37.64% of their time on child care. This percentage of time spent on child care
is relatively close to that of full time working mothers in the data. Despite the lack of
leisure in the model and if it were to be the case that women spend time only at work
or taking care of children, the model produces sensible moments on mothers’ time taking
care of children.
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6 Discussion
6.1 Cost in terms of wages
In the empirical analysis of the paper we showed that there exists a negative relationship
for mothers between living close to parents or in-laws and hourly wages. In our model,
where residence is a choice and depends on life-course offers received and on child care
costs, the same relationship arises. Figure 6.2 shows the wage distributions of working
mothers in both regions. We obverse that the mean of the wage distribution in ’F’ (15.5) is
higher than in ’H’ (13.5). The model thus generates endogenous differences in wage rates
of working mothers. In our model differences in child care costs generate these differences
in wage rates. In ’F’, there is no access to grandparent-provided child care, and women
who work have to pay for child care. This leads to a selection of high productivity type
working women into residing in ’F’.
Figure 6.2: Working mothers’ wage distribution
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In our empirical analysis, we used a Heckman selection model to control for the fact that
observed wages might be biased upward by a selection of women into employment. How-
ever, we were not able to control for a selection into residing close or far from parents or
in-laws. In the model on the other hand, we are able to also control for this additional
selection effect. Figure 6.3 displays the underlying or potential wage distributions for
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women in both regions, before employment decisions. Women reside in ’F’ to take advan-
tage of higher wages. Thus we observe that the potential wage distribution of women in
’F’ lies to the right of the one in ’H’. To analyze whether those who reside in ’H’ despite
lower average wages do so because of grandparent-provided child care, we consider the
underlying wage distributions in both regions when there are no grandparents. Figure 6.4
shows that in this case, wage distributions are the same in both regions. In addition to
the effect of selection into employment, residence choices also contribute to the differences
in the wage distributions of women in ’H’ and in ’F’. While these differences are small
they clearly depend on how wide-spread grandparent-provided child care is.
Figure 6.3: Women’s potential wage distribution
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In our model, women decide where to reside, based on the life-course offers they receive
and taking into account the higher costs of child care in ’F’. Life-course offers consist of
different wages and different spouses’ incomes in both regions. In order to better analyze
the role of life-course offers for women’s decisions, we consider life-course offers that only
differ in one of the two dimensions. First we analyze the role of women’s wages by only
allowing offers to differ across women’s wages in each region. In this case, a life-course
offer consists of a wage and spouse’s income in ’H’ and a different wage and the same
spouse’s income in ’F’. In a second step we maintain wage offers fixed and only vary
spouses’ incomes across regions.
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Figure 6.4: Women’s potential wage distribution, no grandparents
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6.2 Effect of women’s wages on decisions
To study the importance of women’s wages for residence choices, we shut down the spouse’s
income channel. In this case, the only reason to move to ’F’ is a higher wage rate. The
wage distribution of women in ’F’ is thus skewed to the right (see Figure 6.5). The dis-
tribution of spouses’ incomes in ’F’, on the other hand is fairly symmetric. Only 22% of
women live in ’F’ compared to 48% in the benchmark economy. Without any variation in
spouse’s income 58% fewer women reside in ’F’. In our benchmark economy with a certain
probability – as specified in the calibration section – a woman could receive life-course
offers (x1, z3)
H and (x1, z5)
F . Given certain parameters she would be likely to choose the
second option. In the observed distribution of spouse’s incomes only z5 would be regis-
tered. When shutting down the spouse’s income channel the aforementioned life-course
offer will not be available. Instead a women might receive offers (x1, z3)
H and (x1, z3)
F or
(x1, z5)
H and (x1, z5)
F . In one case z3 and in the other z5 will become observations in the
spouse’s income distribution. This is why on the aggregate compared to our benchmark
economy women receive lower spouses’ incomes and they thus participate more. In par-
ticular, in ’F’ 70% of mothers with small children participate. These women can afford
to pay for child care but would decide not to work if their spouse had a higher income.
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Figure 6.5: Women’s potential wage distribution and spouses’ income distribution
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6.3 Effect of spouse’s income on decisions
If on the other hand we shut down the wage channel, women receive the same labor
productivity offer in both regions, but different offers for spouses’ income. In this case,
the main reason for moving to ’F’ lies in a higher spouse’s income and women with rela-
tively higher spouse’s income reside in ’F’. The distribution of productivity types in ’F’
displays a larger variance than the distribution in ’H’ and the distribution of spouses’
incomes in ’F’ is skewed to the right (see Figure 6.6). Again, fewer women reside in ’F’
compared to the benchmark economy, 21% versus 48%. For the same reason that women
receive lower spouses’ incomes when we shut down the spouse’s income channel, they
receive lower productivity offers when we shut down the wage channel. We thus also ob-
serve a decrease in female labor force participation as women face lower wages on average.
Both channels - women’s wages and their spouses’ income - are important for understand-
ing women’s residence choices as well as their decisions regarding labor force participation.
If we shut down both channels and women received the same life-course offers in ’F’ and
’H’ all women would reside in ’H’. Given a positive probability for grandparent-provided
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Figure 6.6: Women’s potential wage distribution and spouses’ income distribution
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child care, the value function for living in ’H’ would always be larger than the one for
living in ’F’.
7 Counterfactual Experiments
In our first counterfactual experiment we analyze a situation in which grandparents are
not available to take care of their grandchildren and in which everyone has to pay for child
care. Our second counterfactual experiment considers subsidies for paid child care. The
purpose of our first experiment is to quantify the importance of grandparent-provided
child care. There are several reasons why the provision of child care by grandparents
might be reduced in the future. Women’s age at first child birth has increased over the
last decades. In 2009, German mothers were on average 30 years old when giving birth
to their first child, while in 1970 average age at first birth was 24 (OECD [2008]). As
successive generations of women delay birth, grandparents may be to be too old or too
sick to take of their grandchildren. On the other hand, women’s labor force participation
and individuals’ retirement age has increased in many countries. Situations where both
29
generations of women – grandmothers and adult daughters – are of working age when
grandchildren come along are going to be even more likely in the future.30 Regarding our
second experiment, we consider a subsidy for child care. Given the positive relationship
found in the literature between availability and low cost of child care and female labor
force participation, we would expect such a policy to lead to an increase in mothers’ labor
force participation. We set the subsidy to 53 per cent of child care costs. This is the
amount of subsidy needed to reduce the cost of child care in our benchmark model such
as to be equal to the cost that Swedish families face. In Sweden, child care costs are
among the lowest compared to other OECD countries, and they amount to 4.6 per cent
of average income (OECD [2008]).
No grandparent-provided child care Table 7.8 provides moments from our first
counterfactual experiment together with the corresponding moments from our benchmark
economy.
Table 7.8: No grandparent-provided child care
No Benchmark
grandparents economy
Aggregate LFP rate of women 56.40 57.74
% of women being mothers, ’H’ 65.21 70.09
% of women being mothers, ’F’ 65.21 64.28
LFP rate of mothers children [0-3), ’H’ 17.85 28.68
LFP rate of mothers children [3-6), ’H’ 48.40 51.09
LFP rate of mothers children [0-3), ’F’ 17.85 19.00
LFP rate of mothers children [3-6), ’F’ 48.40 49.17
share of women living in ’H’ 50.00 52.62
In the benchmark economy, women in ’F’ and those women in ’H’ who have no access
to grandparent-provided child care face high child care costs. Without the availability of
grandparents, the incentive to remain close disappears. We thus observe that the share of
women living in ’F’ is 2.56 percentage points higher compared to the benchmark economy.
30Individuals’ increasing life expectancy and better health might counteract the problem of late first
child birth. However, this increased life expectancy is again likely to lead to successive increases in
retirement age.
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We observe that half the population chooses to live in ’F’ and the other half chooses to live
in ’H’.31 In both regions 65.21 per cent of women are mothers. Labor force participation
of mothers with small children [0-3) decreases in both regions to 17.85 per cent. The fact
that grandparent-provided child care is not available in ’H’ alters incentives to move to
’F’. This changes the composition of productivity types in ’F’ which in turn affects the
labor force participation rate of women in ’F’. Given that without grandparents, child
care for older children [3-6) is more costly, too we also observe a decrease in labor force
participation of mothers with older children.
On the aggregate, labor force participation by women drops 1 percentage point compared
to our benchmark economy. Finally, we observe a drop in fertility. In ’H’ the number
of women who become mothers is reduced by almost 5 percentage points. Women who
would decide to reside in ’H’ if there was grandparent-provided child care, react by moving
more, participating less, and having fewer children. However, given that in our benchmark
economy only 14% of grandparents are readily available for child care, effects of a loss in
availability of grandparents are small on the aggregate.
Child Care Subsidies In our second counterfactual experiment we consider an in-
crease in child care subsidies. In particular, we consider a policy that subsidizes 53% of
child care costs in both periods, i.e. the policy parameter ω is set to 0.53. Table 7.9
displays moments from this counterfactual experiment, next to moments from our bench-
mark economy, with ω = 0.
Under this policy, every woman can afford to become a mother and around 84 per cent of
women work. A child care subsidy not only affects women who live in ’F’, but also those
who live in ’H’ and who do not have access to grandparent-provided child care. It thus
increases labor force participation of mothers in ’H’ as well as of mothers in ’F’. Some
women still have access to free grandparent-provided child care, leading to a slightly higher
participation rate of mothers in ’H’. It is for the same reason that we do not observe any
change in the share of women living in ’F’. The significant increases in both the aggregate
number of mothers and mothers’ labor force participation rates, indicate that subsidizing
child care costs can lead to higher fertility and higher labor force participation by mothers.
31The fact that the population splits into half has to do with how the offers are set up and that we
equally divide those who are indifferent.
31
Table 7.9: Child care subsidy, ω = 0.53
Benchmark
ω = 0.53 economy
Aggregate LFP rate of women 82.91 57.74
% of women being mothers, ’H’ 100.00 70.09
% of women being mothers, ’F’ 100.00 64.28
LFP rate of mothers children [0-3), ’H’ 82.70 28.68
LFP rate of mothers children [3-6), ’H’ 84.22 51.09
LFP rate of mothers children [0-3), ’F’ 81.51 19.00
LFP rate of mothers children [3-6), ’F’ 83.10 49.17
share of women living in ’H’ 52.46 52.62
8 Conclusion
In this paper we document benefits and costs of grandparent-provided child care. Looking
at German data we find that women residing close to parents or in-laws are more likely
to have children and that as mothers they are more likely to hold a regular full-or part
time job. However, we find that their wages are lower and that they are more likely to
incur in commutes. We build a model of residence choice, fertility decisions, and female
labor force participation to account for this trade-off. We simulate the model to match
the German economy in terms of fertility and female labor force participation. We then
perform two counterfactual experiments to analyze how women’s decisions on residence,
fertility, and labor force participation change under distinct scenarios regarding availabil-
ity of grandparent-provided child care and different family policies. We find that if there
was no grandparent-provided child care, fewer women would participate in the labor mar-
ket and fewer would become mothers. We also observe that mobility increases. Hence,
grandparent-provided child care imposes a geographical restriction. One way to remove
this restriction would be to subsidize child care. However, we find no effect on mobility
when we subsidize 53% of child care costs. Though this subsidy leads to increases in both,
aggregate female labor force participation and fertility.
In absence of child care subsidies, grandparent-provided child care plays an important
role for mothers’ labor force participation. However, women who remain close to their
parents or in-laws only access a confined labor market, which might imply worse labor
market opportunities and thus lower wages. Hence, when designing policies aimed at in-
32
creasing labor force participation of mothers, policy makers should take into account the
wide-spread presence of grandparent-provided child care as well as the spatial restrictions
it implies. For instance, a policy that subsidizes grandparents’ time may not only affect
mothers’ labor force participation but it may also have an impact on their wages and/or
commutes.
In this paper we simply assume that being close to one’s grandparents’ implies that
with a certain probability grandparents take care of their grandchildren, and we do not
consider grandparents’ decisions to provide care. However, this decision might be very
much related to individuals’ retirement age and especially in the case of grandmothers to
previous decisions about labor force participation. In this sense, opposing cohort effects
of female labor force participation could arise. On the one hand, having a working mother
increases the likelihood for her daughters to also become working mothers.32 On the other
hand, a grandmother who is actively participating in the labor market might be less likely
to provide child care for her grandchild, something that is found to increase mother’s labor
force participation rates. We believe that a very interesting road for future research could
be an analysis of how late first birth and improved health after retirement interact with
these forces.
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Figure A-1: Grandparent-provided Care for grandchildren, ≤ 6
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
Figure A-2: Frequency of care for and distance to grandchild, ≤ 6
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
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Figure A-3: Frequency of care for and distance to grandchild, ≤ 6
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
Figure A-4: Frequency of care for and distance to grandchild, ≤ 6
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
39
Table A.1: Means (Std.) - GSOEP pooled sample-
- 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006-
Women Mothers
25-50 25-50
Age 37.4 (7.1) 38.8 (6.6)
30-34 0.20 0.18
35-39 0.22 0.24
40-44 0.21 0.25
45-50 0.20 0.23
Married, living together 0.68 0.79
Other than German nationality 0.02 0.01
Children 0.76 1
Children 0-2 0.10 0.13
Children 3-6 0.14 0.19
Number of Children 1.5(1.2) 2.0(0.9)
Primary education 0.01 0.01
Tertiary education 0.27 0.26
Regular fulltime job 0.36 0.25
Regular part time job 0.24 0.29
Small community 0.45 0.48
Large community 0.29 0.26
in East Germany 0.25 0.28
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.14 0.13
Parents or in-laws close 0.42 0.44
- Parents or in-laws in same neighborhood 0.19 0.21
- Parents or in-laws in same town 0.23 0.24
Parents or in-laws far away 0.44 0.43
- Parents or in-laws one hour away 0.29 0.29
- Parents or in-laws further away 0.15 0.13
Parents or in-laws in foreign country 0.01 0.01
Children in non-relative care (nursery, sitter, paid care etc.)*** - 0.65
- Children (< 3) - 0.14
- Children (3− 6) - 0.84
Children cared for by relatives*** - 0.34
- Children (> 3) - 0.33
- Children (3− 6) - 0.34
Spouse’s income* 2844.5 (2362.0) 2865.0 (2159.0)
Hourly wage** 12.4 (6.2) 12.1 (6.2)
Tenure in firm** 8.4 (7.3) 8.9 (7.6)
Commuter**** 0.50 0.49
N 10,732 8,129
*** Only available for 2001 and 2006 (N = 761 for < 3, N1296 for 3 − 6.) *Only taking into account strictly positive income (N = 7, 323,
N = 6, 083 for women, mothers) **Among those working regular part-or fulltime jobs (N = 6, 471 ,N = 4, 348)**** Only available for 2001
and 2006 (N = 4363, N = 2913).
Table A.2: Use of relative-provided child care by proximity to parents or in-laws
(number of observations )
Mothers with Working Mothers with Mothers with Working Mothers with
children <= 6 children <= 6 children < 3 children < 3
All 34.9% (n = 2148) 44.4% (n = 786) 33.3% (n = 901) 46.6% (n = 176)
Parents or in-laws in same house 49.8% (n = 265) 64.6% (n = 99) 48.6% (n = 111) 77.8% (n = 18)
Parents or in-laws close 45.1% (n = 990) 53.8% (n = 379) 43.7% (n = 398) 57.6% (n = 85)
- Parents or in-laws in same neighborhood 50.7% (n = 489) 56.8% (n = 190) 49.5% (n = 204) 60.5% (n = 43)
- Parents or in-laws in same town 39.5% (n = 501) 50.8% (n = 189) 37.6% (n = 194) 54.8% (n = 42)
Parents or in-laws far away 19.1% (n = 893) 26.3% (n = 308) 18.4% (n = 392) 26.0% (n = 73)
- Parents or in-laws one hour away 24.7% (n = 635) 32.1% (n = 224) 24.6% (n = 280) 32.7% (n = 52)
- Parents or in-laws further away 5.4% (n = 241) 11.3% (n = 80) 2.8% (n = 107) 10.0%(n = 20)
Parents or in-laws in foreign country 5.9% (n = 17) 0 (n = 4) 0 (n = 5) 0 (n = 1)
Women 25-50, pooled waves 2001 and 2006.
Table A.3: Use of relative-provided child care, age, health status and labor force
participation of grandmothers (number of observations )
All Close to own parents and using relative-provided care
Mothers with Working Mothers with Mothers with Working Mothers with
children <= 6 children <= 6 children <= 6 children <= 6
Age grandmother 58.0 (7.8) (n = 503) 57.9 (7.7)(n = 151) 57.3 (7.7)(n = 81) 55.4(7.4) (n = 33)
Grandmother not employed 51.5% (n = 410) 45.2% (n = 126) 64.2% (n = 67) 61.5% (n = 26)
Grandmother works full time 25.8% (n = 410) 32.5% (n = 126) 17.9% (n = 67) 30.8% (n = 26)
Grandmother works part time 18.0% (n = 410) 15.9% (n = 126) 13.4% (n = 67) 7.7% (n = 26)
Grandmother very good or good health 30.2% (n = 410) 21.4% (n = 126) 28.4% (n = 67) 26.9% (n = 26)
Grandmother not good or bad health 23.7%(n = 410) 23.0%(n = 126) 28.4% (n = 67) 26.9% (n = 26)
Women 25-50, pooled waves 2001 and 2006.
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Table A.4: Marginal effects from Probit estimation for having children
Married, living together 0.286*** (0.012)
Other than German nationality 0.008 (0.027)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.004*** (0.001)
in East Germany 0.177*** (0.023)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.089*** (0.010)
Parents or in-laws close 0.041*** (0.009)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.002 (0.013)
Small community 0.036*** (0.011)
Large community -0.065*** (0.012)
Observations 10,732
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses:
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06;
Women 25-50. Regression includes year, state, and age group dummies. Reference
group: unmarried women age 25-29, with education level 1 or 2(ISCED:0-4),
living in West Germany in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1991, in a medium-sized
town, far from parents or in-laws.
Table A.5: Marginal effects from Probit estimation for having children
with interaction terms
Married, living together 0.286*** (0.012) 0.286*** (0.012)
Other than German nationality 0.008 (0.027) 0.008 (0.027)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001)
in East Germany 0.178*** (0.023) 0.178*** (0.023)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.102*** (0.013)
Primary/Secondary edu (ISCED: 0-4) 0.102*** (0.013)
Parents or in-laws close 0.032*** (0.010) 0.064*** (0.016)
Parents in-laws close*Tert edu 0.031* (0.017)
Parents in-laws close*Non-Tert edu -0.033* (0.020)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.001 (0.013) 0.001 (0.013)
Small community 0.036*** (0.011) 0.036*** (0.011)
Large community -0.065*** (0.012) -0.065*** (0.012)
Observations 10,732 10,732
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1 Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; Women 25-50. Regressions include year, state, and age group dummies. Reference group:
unmarried women age 25-29 with education level 3 (ISCED 5,6) and education level 1 or 2(ISCED:0-4) respectively
living in West Germany in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1991, in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws.
Table A.6: Marginal effects from Probit estimation for mothers’ labor force participation
Regular Part or
Fulltime Job
Number of children -0.114*** (0.007)
Children 0-2 -0.398*** (0.016)
Married, living together -0.128*** (0.017)
Other than German nationality -0.123** (0.054)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.006*** (0.002)
in East Germany 0.116** (0.046)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.171*** (0.014)
Parents or in-laws close 0.029** (0.013)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.022 (0.019)
Small community -0.003 (0.015)
Large community 0.018 (0.017)
Observations 8,129
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel, 91,96,01,06; Mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried
mothers age 25-29 with education level 1 or 2(ISCED:0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized town in West
Germany North Rhine-Westphalia , far from parents or in-laws, with children age 3 or older.
Regression includes year, state, and age group dummies.
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Table A.7: Marginal effects from Probit estimation for labor force participation of (1)
men and (2) single childless women
Regular Part or Regular Part or
Fulltime Job Fulltime Job
(1) (2)
Married, living together 0.106*** (0.008)
Other than German nationality -0.096*** (0.032) -0.097 (0.071)
in East Germany -0.067** (0.027) -0.299** (0.136)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.088*** (0.006) 0.135*** (0.024)
Parents or in-laws close 0.009 (0.007) 0.033 (0.028)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.008 (0.010) -0.100*** (0.037)
Small community 0.003 (0.009) -0.034 (0.036)
Large community -0.013 (0.010) -0.125*** (0.033)
Observations 8,653 1,176
1) Men 25-50. Reference group: unmarried men age 25-29 with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a
medium-sized town in West Germany in North Rhine-Westphalia, far from parents or in-laws 2) single childless
women (25-50). Reference group: women age 25-29 in 1991, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4), in a medium-
sized town in West Germany in North Rhine-Westphalia. Regressions include year, state, and age group dummies.
Table A.8: Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for mothers’ log monthly wages
Log monthly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Married, living together -0.035** (0.017) -0.326*** (0.044)
Number of children -0.047*** (0.010) -0.287*** (0.017)
Other than German nationality -0.116 (0.083) -0.311** (0.140)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.282*** (0.016) 0.441*** (0.036)
Parents or in-laws close -0.056*** (0.015) 0.073** (0.033)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.059*** (0.022) 0.056 (0.048)
Small community -0.038** (0.018) -0.007 (0.039)
Large community 0.053*** (0.020) 0.046 (0.044)
in East Germany -0.081* (0.042) 0.296*** (0.119)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.016*** (0.005)
Children 0-2 -1.105*** (0.056)
Tenure in firm 0.017*** (0.001)
Monthly hours worked 0.007*** (0.000)
Constant 5.787*** (0.055) 0.186** (0.087)
Observations 8,129 8,129
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried mothers of age 25-29 of children age 3 or older with
education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town in North Rhine-Westphalia , far from
parents or in-laws. Regressions include age group, state, and year dummies.
Table A.9: Proximity to grandparents and hourly wages
Coefficients of OLS estimation of mothers’ log hourly wages
Married, living together 0.000 (0.015)
Number of children -0.026*** (0.008)
Other than German nationality -0.121 (0.077)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.280*** (0.014)
Tenure in firm 0.016*** (0.001)
Parents or in-laws close -0.052*** (0.014)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.052** (0.020)
Small community -0.040** (0.017)
Large community 0.045** (0.019)
in East Germany -0.081* (0.044)
Constant 1.955*** (0.041)
Observations 4,348
R-squared 0.262
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 OLS Estimation; Data:
GSOEP unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50 with full-or part time regular job.
Regression includes age group, state, and year dummies. Reference group: unmarried
mothers age 25-29 living in West Germany in North Rhine-Westphalia , with education
level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4), in 1991, in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws.
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Table A.10: Proximity to grandparents and hourly wages
Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for mothers’ log hourly wages without variables
posing a possible endogeneity problem: marital status and spouse’s income
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Number of children -0.038*** (0.010) -0.292*** (0.017)
Other than German nationality -0.135* (0.077) -0.340** (0.139)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.293*** (0.015) 0.433*** (0.036)
Parents or in-laws close -0.049*** (0.014) 0.061* (0.033)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.051** (0.020) 0.037 (0.047)
Small community -0.040** (0.016) -0.014 (0.038)
Large community 0.046** (0.019) 0.056 (0.044)
in East Germany -0.067 (0.044) 0.314*** (0.119)
Children 0-2 -1.117*** (0.056)
Tenure in firm 0.016*** (0.001)
Constant 1.897*** (0.047) 0.061 (0.083)
Observations 8,129 8,129
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heckman Selection Model; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel
91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50. Reference group: mothers of age 25-29 of children age 3 and older living in West Germany, with
education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town in North Rhine-Westphalia , far from parents
or in-laws. Regressions include age group, state, and year dummies.
Table A.11: Proximity to grandparents and hourly wages
Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for low educated mothers’ log hourly wages
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Married, living together -0.002 (0.019) -0.341*** (0.051)
Other than German nationality -0.207** (0.090) -0.435*** (0.155)
Number of children -0.038*** (0.012) -0.290*** (0.020)
Parents or in-laws close -0.042** (0.017) 0.059 (0.038)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.038 (0.024) 0.035 (0.054)
Small community -0.043** (0.020) -0.013 (0.044)
Large community 0.042* (0.022) 0.048 (0.050)
in East Germany -0.135*** (0.048) 0.477*** (0.117)
Children 0-2 -1.102*** (0.070)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.018*** (0.006)
Tenure in firm 0.017*** (0.001)
Constant 1.895*** (0.055) 0.190* (0.097)
Observations 6,035 6,035
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heckman Selection Model; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel
91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50 with primary pr secondary education. Reference group: mothers of age 25-29 of children age 3
and older living in West Germany, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town
in North Rhine-Westphalia , far from parents or in-laws. Regressions include dummies for age groups, states and years.
44
Table A.12: Proximity to grandparents and hourly wages
Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for high educated mothers’ log hourly wages
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Married, living together -0.015 (0.028) -0.286*** (0.095)
Number of children -0.026 (0.016) -0.265*** (0.038)
Other than German nationality 0.089 (0.148) 0.220 (0.353)
Parents or in-laws close -0.066*** (0.024) 0.090 (0.068)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.069* (0.038) 0.159 (0.107)
Small community -0.038 (0.030) -0.029 (0.084)
Large community 0.047 (0.033) 0.042 (0.091)
in East Germany -0.146** (0.064) 0.307* (0.174)
Children 0-2 -1.095*** (0.098)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.007 (0.011)
Tenure in firm 0.013*** (0.002)
Constant 2.266*** (0.088) 0.679*** (0.208)
Observations 2,094 2,094
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heckman Selection Model; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel
91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50, with tertiary education. Reference group: mothers of age 25-29 with children age 3 and older living
in West Germany, with education level 3 (ISCED: 5-6) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town in North Rhine-
Westphalia, far from parents or in-laws. Regressions include age group, state, and year dummies.
Table A.13: Grandparent-provided child care and commutes
Marginal effects from Probit Estimation for mothers without variable
posing a possible endogeneity problem: Children in non-relative care
Commuter
Married, living together 0.006 (0.055)
Number of children 0.053 (0.033)
Other than German nationality -0.278** (0.127)
Children 0-2 -0.024 (0.060)
Log (Spouse’s income)† -0.003 (0.011)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.126** (0.051)
Tenure in firm 0.004 (0.004)
Children cared for by relatives 0.088* (0.048)
Small community 0.263*** (0.055)
Large community -0.213*** (0.065)
in East Germany -0.228* (0.135)
Observations 537
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 01, 06; mothers 25-50 of children <= 6 with regular full or part
time job. Regression includes year, state, and age group dummies. Reference
group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 in 1997 living in West Germany, in North
Rhine-Westphalia with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized
town in 2001, far from parents or in-laws, with children who are not cared for by relatives.
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Table A.14: Grandparent-provided child care and commutes
Marginal effects from Probit Estimation for
(1) low educated and (2) high educated mothers
Commuter Commuter
(1) (2)
Married, living together 0.003 (0.071) 0.015 (0.095)
Number of children 0.057 (0.042) 0.022 (0.056)
Other than German nationality -0.438*** (0.108) -0.016 (0.217)
Children 0-2 -0.148* (0.086) 0.125 (0.093)
Log (Spouse’s income)† -0.019 (0.015) 0.019 (0.018)
Tenure in firm 0.008 (0.005) -0.000 (0.008)
Children cared for by relatives 0.097 (0.061) 0.106 (0.088)
Children in non-relative care 0.017 (0.086) -0.098 (0.133)
Small community 0.268*** (0.068) 0.260** (0.106)
Large community -0.222*** (0.082) -0.264** (0.119)
in East Germany -0.280* (0.156) 0.125 (0.232)
Observations 352 183
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 01, 06; mothers
25-50 of children <= 6 with regular full or part time job. Regressions include year, state, and age group dummies.
Reference group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 in 2001 living in West Germany, in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1991,
in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws, with children who are not in nursery, nor cared for by relatives.
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